Christian Civil Order and the American Revision
A Response to Kevin DeYoung
Today Kevin DeYoung published a piece comparing the original version of the Westminster Confession of Faith with the American revision on the role of civil magistrate. He concludes that “the American revision of 1788 represents a substantial change from the doctrinal assumptions of the 16th century.” By “substantial” he means not only that the documents contain contrary propositions concerning the power of the magistrate but also that the revision is a significant departure from the original.
I will not dispute that there was a substantive change between the two. But the change itself does little to support the cause of the postwar Christian secularist or the “radical two kingdoms” advocates or anyone opposed to Christian civil order. The key question is whether the revised version opposes Christian civil order and supports secularism or religious neutrality. I affirm that it supports and even demands (when possible) Christian civil order.
Removal Does not Imply Denial
We first must recognize a crucial principle often overlooked by those most ardently committed to the revised confession, namely, that the mere removal of some proposition from the confession or the catechism does not itself require one to deny that proposition or to affirm its contrary. Why? Because full subscription requires only that one affirms what is explicitly stated in the text. No full subscriber is required to affirm what is absent from the text. The revised confession, for example, removed “by the power of the civil magistrate” from 20.4 in a paragraph about censuring those who error in religious opinion or practice. The act of removal does not itself bind the subscriber either to deny what was removed or to affirm its contrary.
Moreover, this follows from the nature of contraries: for contraries statements, both can be false. The fact that some proposition is false does not entail that its contrary is true. Thus, even if the removal implies falsity, it does not follow that the contrary is true. The proposition, “the magistrate has power over no erroneous religious opinion and practice” does not follow from denying the proposition, “the magistrate has power over all erroneous religious opinions and practices.” The only necessary consequence (again, if removal implies falsity) is that the contradictory is true: “the magistrate lacks power over some erroneous religious opinions or practices.” This is how categorical propositions logically operate.
But, again, removal itself does not imply, for full subscribers, that the removed propositions is false. Full subscribers are required to say “false” only to propositions that the confession explicitly states are false or false by necessary consequence. Absence (even by removal) does not imply falsity.
Put simply, removing “and by the power of the civil magistrate” from 20.4 does not itself entail a requirement to affirm the contrary: that “the civil magistrate lacks the power to act against all erroneous religion.”
Therefore, it is best to see the removal of suppositions in a confessional document as granting liberty to full subscribers to hold opposite opinions, unless explicit language is inserted requiring an opposite opinion. Removal of text is merely a trimming of substance from full subscription. This applies also to the removal of 31.2, which concerns the power of magistrates to call synods of ministers, and to the removal of “tolerating false religion” from the Westminster Larger Catechism 109 and the pope as the antichrist from 25.6.
Chapter 23 Revisions
The American revisers rewrote Section 3 of Chapter 23. DeYoung summarizes it with the following:
In its place, the American revision lists four basic functions for the civil magistrate relative to the church: (1) protect the church so its ministry and assemblies aren’t disturbed, (2) give no preference to any denominations of Christians above the rest, (3) ensure no law infringes on the free exercise and free association of Christians, and (4) protect all people so no one is injured or maligned based on his or her religion or lack of religion.
This is a simplistic reading of the revision. Let’s look closely at 23.3.
Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the Word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven; or, in the least, interfere in matters of faith.
The only substantive addition here is “in the least, interfere in matters of faith.” DeYoung makes much of this, claiming its meaning as “the civil magistrate has no authority to punish his people based on religion (or irreligion).” But, without evidence to the contrary, this statement is consistent with long-held Presbyterian belief, reflected even in the work of Presbyterian George Gillespie, whom DeYoung discusses as representing the original version.
Gillespie writes, “neither may they [princes], by their own authority, and without a council, decide any controverted matter of Faith.” Broadly, it confirms the classic in sacris/circa sacra distinction, viz. that magistrates have power around religious things, but not in religious things. That Christian princes have no powers in matters of faith is the classical Protestant position; and in Presbyterian circles this lack-of-power extended to doctrinal disputes.
The next part of the revision says this:
Yet, as nursing fathers, it is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the church of our common Lord, without giving the preference to any denomination of Christians above the rest, in such a manner that all ecclesiastical persons whatever shall enjoy the full, free, and unquestioned liberty of discharging every part of their sacred functions, without violence or danger.
Let’s first notice in the revision that civil magistrates, while perhaps lacking certain powers over “matters of faith” are still cognizant of—have principled knowledge of—doctrines of the faith, including their duties as “nursing fathers” over the “church” (a divine institution) and of the Lord Jesus Christ. Thus, civil magistrates can in principle and as magistrates have knowledge of supernatural things. Furthermore, they are called to act in light of that knowledge—to “protect” the church. In doing so, they are acting as Christian magistrates, for they are acting for the church according to distinctly Christian truth.
In speaking a “common Lord”, the revisers acknowledged a good, Protestant truth—that unity in the faith is not a matter of institutional unity (as we find in Roman Catholicism, Mormonism, and JWs) but unity in the Gospel. Thus, the civil magistrate as a “nursing father” has a special calling to protect true churches of Jesus Christ, according to the principle of Protestant brotherhood. He is not a nursing father to false or heretical churches, nor to non-Christian religious groups.
The text indeed says that Christian magistrates must give “no preference to any denominations of Christians,” but most commentators (including DeYoung) miss the qualifier later in the sentence— “in such a manner”. The magistrate may not prefer in such a manner that church ministers of true churches are hindered from “the full, free, and unquestioned liberty of discharging every part of their sacred functions.”
Contrary to DeYoung’s claim, this does not logically preclude church establishment. An established church and religious liberty for dissenting Protestants are not opposed, for church establishment does not necessarily hinder dissenting ministers from exercising their full, free, and unquestioned liberty to discharge his sacred functions. Thus, the text (at least so far) does not require one to affirm (or deny) disestablishmentarianism.
Even John Witherspoon (whom DeYoung cites) affirmed establishment alongside religious liberty. In his Lectures on Moral Philosophy, he writes (Lecture 14):
Many are of opinion that besides all this, the magistrate ought to make public provision for the worship of God, in such manner as is agreeable to the great body of the society; though at the same time all who dissent from it, are fully tolerated. And indeed, there seems to be a good deal of reason for it, that so instruction may be provided for the bulk of common people, who would, many of them, neither support nor employ teachers, unless they were obliged. The magistrates right in this case, seems to be something like that of a parent, they have a right to instruct, but not to constrain.
So far, if there is substantive change at all from the original, the revision applies Christian charity to fellow Protestant brethren to support a sort of pan-Protestant unity and peace as opposed to a narrower Presbyterian unity.
The next sentence is:
And, as Jesus Christ hath appointed a regular government and discipline in his church, no law of any commonwealth should interfere with, let, or hinder, the due exercise thereof, among the voluntary members of any denomination of Christians, according to their own profession and belief.
This statement by itself says only that civil magistrates must not seize for themselves the spiritual power ordained for the instituted church to receive and discipline members. Is this not the old Presbyterian position in opposition to the “Erastian” view? At best, it denies the claim in the original that civil rulers can correct the “abuse” of discipline. The revision limits the magistrate only in things internal to churches, which does not preclude authority over public actions directed to the public. In other words, churches are akin to civil associations, having control over their voluntary membership in things pertaining to the association. But this says nothing about civil government’s authority over public actions directed to the public.
Lastly, the text says:
It is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the person and good name of all their people, in such an effectual manner as that no person be suffered, either upon pretense of religion or of infidelity, to offer any indignity, violence, abuse, or injury to any other person whatsoever: and to take order, that all religious and ecclesiastical assemblies be held without molestation or disturbance.
Often misinterpreted, the first part says only that magistrates should not permit a religious zealot to, apart from law, “offer any indignity, violence, abuse, or injury to any other person” on account of religious differences. That is, all religious mobs upset over even real heresy, infidelity or blasphemy should be restrained. The last line extends this to religious groups having formed a religious association. Nothing here precludes the civil rulers themselves from acting against public heresy, infidelity, or blasphemy. It merely forbids anyone from acting apart from law against those with whom they disagree.
What Changed?
We’ve established that removal itself says nothing about whether the propositions removed are true or false; rather, it merely permits full subscribers to hold opposing views. Thus, we looked at the added text in the revision to determine whether the original and revision require opposing positions. We find in the revision the following:
1. Civil magistrates must not “interfere in matters of faith,” which is consistent with the old in sacris / circa sacra distinction, and even consistent with distinctive Presbyterian beliefs (contra Erastianism) on the role of the civil magistrate vis-à-vis deciding doctrinal disputes.
2. The civil magistrate, as nursing father, must protect all true churches of Christ, and he is forbidden from showing preference only in such a manner that any minister of a true church is hindered from fulfilling his sacred office. This permits church establishment when dissenting true Christians are free to conduct ministry.
3. Magistrates should not claim for themselves the spiritual power of the instituted church, nor interfere in the internal affairs of true churches. This does not speak to public action but rather the exclusive power of churches to order and regulate themselves—as voluntary religious associations—as they see fit, without external meddling.
4. Civil magistrates must restrain anyone who acts apart from law to harm individuals or associating groups on account of religious differences.
Thus, nothing in the revised version precludes church establishment and lawful action against heresy and blasphemy in the interest of civil society and the churches of our common Lord. And its positive affirmations affirm that civil rulers both know supernatural, Christian truth and ought to act in light of that truth, specifically for the good of Christ’s kingdom on earth, namely, the Church.
The significant change in substance between the original and revised are principally located in the extension of Christian charity in the latter, developed over time in Protestant experience, to see the possibility of a pan-Protestant civil order. Instead of a narrow Presbyterian establishment, the American political order would be one of Protestant brotherhood, involving a mutual recognition of each other’s genuine faith, while retaining doctrinal and denominational distinctives. This does not require a wholesale rejection of the original text. Rather, the power of civil magistrate is communicated via example and countenance. As Witherspoon said,
The magistrate (or ruling part of any society) ought to encourage piety by his own example, and by endeavoring to make it an object of public esteem. Whenever the general opinion is in favor of any thing it will have many followers. Magistrates may promote and encourage men of piety and virtue, and they may discountenance those whom it would be improper to punish.
Nevertheless, some things must be punished: magistrates should “enact laws for the punishment of acts of profanity and impiety.” And also, “to promote true religion is the best and most effectual way of making virtuous and regular people.” This fits well with what the revisers left untouched in 23.2, that magistrates must “maintain piety, justice, and peace, according to the wholesome laws of each commonwealth.”
I would suggest that one can affirm both the original and the revised without contradiction if one applies the former by means of the latter. That is, they apply it through the Anglo-Protestant tradition of religious liberty, developed out of charity among Protestant brothers. And thus we can pray, as instructed by (the unrevised) Q. 191 of the Larger Catechism, that “the church [is] purged from corruption, countenanced and maintained by the civil magistrate.”
Conclusion
Whether or not the original and revised editions require opposing views is, at this point, far more an academic question or perhaps a matter of conscience for ministers than it is a serious determinate of practical action today. The fact is, the American version permits not only church establishment and a Christian civil order that privileges Christianity but one that is encouraged and, in a way, enforced by civil authority. Very few in the “American revision” camp have reckoned with the fact that their secularism and their opposition to Christian nations and to public Christianity is not consistent with their cherished American revision.
It is, however, fully consistent with American Christian nationalism—a Chrisitan nationalism that acknowledges the Christian civil order of our past along with our inherited tradition of religious liberty (see e.g., The Case for Christian Nationalism, 475).
Image: Philadelphia from Second Street Taken from Market Street, circa 1800.