The Christian Defense of Inequality
A Response to John Carter
For several centuries, the political right has argued against ideas of human equality. Edmund Burke opposed the “leveling” of the French Revolution, as did Joseph de Maistre a few years later. John Adams wrote that “false notions of equality [are] the source of much folly and wickedness.” And, of course, the Antebellum South declared its opposition, notably by Reformed theologian R.L. Dabney.
But these writers were on the losing side of history, as equality went from moral equality, to civic and social equality, to equality of opportunity, and to current-day notions of “equity.” The political right today—the more authentic right—has continued its critique of this folly, facing threats of personal ruin from the mainstream. Many have suffered at the hands of former friends, whose political ambitions carried them to the warm respectability of the left. And the left’s condition for respectability is always purge those to your right.
In our more anonymous age, sharing dangerous ideas is much less risky. But in the past, those who questioned equality were typically Christians (at least culturally), and nearly all affirmed some degree of natural equality between all men. Adams, who believed that “physical inequalities among men…are infinite,” still declared that “We are all of the same Species: made by the same God: possessed of Minds and Bodies alike in Essence: having all the same Reason, Passions, Affections and appetites. All Men are Men and not Beasts.”[1]
But with the rise of what some have called the “neo-pagan right” or the “Nietzschean right”—spearheaded by men such as Bronze Age Pervert—critics of equality have begun targeting key doctrines of the Christian faith. In their view, Christianity shares much of the blame for the equality madness of our time.
I. Denying the Divine Image
Representative of this nascent movement is a recent essay by John Carter, a prominent account with a popular Substack (Postcards from Barsoom). He argues not only that human equality is a “pure abstraction which does not actually exist,” but that the idea of imago dei is to blame for the West’s disastrous embrace of this abstraction. Christian theology, he claims, sets up a “binary” between those of “infinite worth” (humans) and everything else—the rest being much less valuable or valueless. However, each human in this binary has equally “limitless” value. Carter considers this absurd. In short, he argues against moral and natural equality between human beings and envisions this argument as a solution or rebuttal to modern equality madness.
In its place, Carter posits a “moral continuum” in which the value of any particular thing—whether human, animal, organism, or inanimate material—exists in a spectrum of value. This spectrum does not accord with the traditional order of being, as in Aristotelian metaphysics. We are not predicating essences or properties on species and genera. The things of each kind—where “kind” seems to be strictly nominal—are unequal among themselves such that “value is never equal, but never zero.” There is a sort of order of being here, since Carter wants to assign value to things, but the basic units are not kinds or species and genera but particular objects.
Each thing is on the spectrum without any real group delineation. No human is of equal value to another human; each is somewhere on the spectrum. There are people-groups, formed based on “similarity” or closeness on the spectrum, each functionally treated as a sort of species of man (making “man” a functional, nominal genus), deserving higher or lower orders of social organization and legal regimes. But again, this human genus is nominal, for Carter suggests that some primates might have higher cognitive ability than some humans and therefore have more value. So, in the end, only particular things are real, and they are grouped only nominally and functionally. Their order of value on the spectrum is not determined by their real kind but by each thing’s functional capacities. Though deeply modern (with some ancient precursors), Carter’s system is simply affirming “reality” (so he claims), and it escapes the ideological binary that has held the West captive for millennia and is now destroying us.
There is much more to the article, and much can be said of and critiqued in the piece—his understanding of Christian anthropology, his resurrection of Heraclitean metaphysics (perhaps following the unmentioned Daniel Dennett), his various biological claims, his view of equality under the law, and his view of human “similarity.” I will not cover it all here. Nor will I address adjacent concerns, including why Christian doctrine does not require mass third-world immigration and how it does recognize similarity in way of life as a condition for a flourishing political community.[2]
My principal interest here is a defense of Christianity by way of justifying both human equality and social-political inequality, or demonstrating that Christian anthropology (which includes the divine image) does not necessitate or demand social-political equality. In most of Christian history, Christians have affirmed both moral equality and “a world of distinction, difference, and hierarchy”—the latter being what Carter thinks the imago dei renders impossible. So, I am not seeking to refute Carter’s philosophical positions, but to show that the problem he identifies—the perverse excesses of equality-talk—does not follow from classical Christian theology and practice.
II. Equality and Inequality
Equality in the Christian Tradition
The concept of human equality has been central to political theory for several hundred years, much of which is well-known among the educated. The absolutist Thomas Hobbes, author of the Leviathan (1651), insists that “nature hath made men so equal…[that] the difference between man and man is not so considerable.” Fellow social contract theorists, Locke and Rousseau, affirmed similar notions of equality. And, of course, the American founders claimed that “all men are created equal.” Equality was a prerequisite of consent, which for them grounded the legitimacy of civil authority. Equality has been central to post-Reformational political theory, and early modern Protestant writers affirmed “natural equality.”
But ideas of human equality predate the early modern period. The Roman Stoics—Cicero, Seneca, and others—affirmed the communes notitiae [common notions], later recognized by Christians as the natural law inscribed in the heart.[3] And they called for human equality before the natural law. “Quod ad ius naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt” [As far as the law of nature is concerned, all men are equal], states the Digest, drawing from Ulpian.[4] Cicero, in De Republica, famously states that “rights should be equal” among citizens, and a “state” is an “association of citizens under the law.” In De Legibus (I.VII), Cicero grants that man has “aliquid divinum” [something divine], an inborn simulacrum dicatum—or “consecrated image [of God].” So, universal equality—natural and civil—predates the Christian use of imago dei, and some recognized a simulacrum of the divine in man.
Many pre-Christian Romans had a sense of divine mission, that the Roman Empire would bring civilization to the nations. Rome, through Augustus Caesar and the “toga-bearing Romans,” would spread civilization—rule, law, and order—to the world by means of arms. Virgil declared in The Aeneid that Rome was “to pacify, to impose the rule of law” on the nations (Aeneid, 6.1153). The point being: the Romans, at least in the Late Republic and Early Empire, affirmed notions of universality—or humanity—that included ideas of equality and subjection to universal natural laws. The nations could be civilized precisely because there is a sort of fundamental natural equality under the universal natural law. Rome was the civilizing agent for humanity, actualizing the inborn potency of man.
These ideas of universal natural law and natural equality were taken up by Christian theologians. Like the aforementioned secular authors, most Christian thinkers for millennia saw no contradiction between natural equality and social and political inequality. In fact, on this point, there is a direct line from Cicero, through Augustine, to both Roman Catholic and Protestant thinkers in the early modern period. In De Republica, Cicero writes,
As among the different sounds which proceed from lyres, flutes, and the human voice, there must be maintained a certain harmony…which may be elicited in full and absolute concord by the modulation even of voices very unlike one another; so, where reason is allowed to modulate the diverse elements of the state, there is obtained a perfect concord from the upper, lower, and middle classes as from various sounds; and what musicians call harmony in singing, is concord in matters of state, which is the strictest bond and best security of any republic.
Augustine references this in City of God (II.21), which is later echoed by Petrus Gregorious (1540-1597) in his De Republic (VI.1) and Johannes Althusius (1563-1638) in Politica (I.36). Likewise, in his commentary on 2 Corinthians 8:14, John Calvin speaks of a “befitting harmony” in the “mutual contribution” of abilities and means in society, even though abilities and means are “distributed unequally.”
Protestant writers insisted that nature dictates inequality. Calvin says, for example, that the “political distinction of ranks” is dictated by “natural reason.”[5] Calvin even believed that had sin not entered the world, “all would be alike in integrity,” but “some would have had special gifts: for there would have been, I allow, a difference of endowments had nature remained perfect.”[6] In Politica, Althusius distinguishes aequabilitas (fairness) and aequalitas (equality), saying that aequalitas—in which “citizens are leveled among themselves”—causes only “disorder and disturbance.” Reformed theologian Francis Turretin said, “Nor if the law of nature makes all men equal with regard to nature does it follow that they are equal with regard to qualities and external condition.”[7]
The fact is, until recently, most Christian thinkers firmly believed that natural equality and civil, social, and political inequality are perfectly compatible, and they explicitly denied that equality is the principal telos of civil order or its fundamental animating principle. They believed that natural reason—given the nature of man—and the obviously unequal distribution of talents, intelligence, and vocations, dictate the necessity of distinction, difference, and hierarchy.
It is true, however, that the image of God in Christian thought places duties on how man treats fellow man. Calvin states, “The Lord command all men, without exception, to do good unto all…not to look to what men in themselves deserve, but to attend to the image of God which exists in all, and to which we owe all honor and love.”[8] This is where Carter gets his mileage. There is prima facie ambiguity as to the duties owed to God’s image bearers, and certainly, Christians in recent times have exploited this ambiguity. My own work has critiqued this exploitation and called for a return to classical Protestantism. I would argue that the imago dei, as used by many Christians today, conceals underlying modern notions of dignity. They’ve Christianized what is fundamentally a post-Kantian idea. But, as I demonstrate below, the image of God (as traditionally understood) does not conflict with distinction, difference, and hierarchy.
But before getting into the theology, let me dispense with two repeated claims in Carter’s piece. First, I want to address Carter’s claim that the image of God entails that man has “infinite value.” No one before the 20th century, to my knowledge, claimed that man is of “infinite worth.” Pope John Paul II is often associated with this and related language, and the Roman Catholic Church in 2024 published their “Dignitas Infinita,” declaring that “every human person possesses an infinite dignity.” I (along with any classical Protestant) reject this as blasphemous, since only Christ is of infinite dignity and worth. As Turretin said, “the infinity of his person [Christ] gives an infinite worth to his sufferings.”[9] If all men are of “infinite worth,” then any man could die for the sins of the world. Since “infinite worth” is so fundamental to Carter’s argument, many of his conclusions are left unproven, given my rejection of this premise.
Second, Carter makes much of the “image” and “likeness” distinction found in Genesis 1:26. But most Reformed Protestants believed that this expresses an hendiadys, two words joined by a conjunction expressing one idea. Thomas Aquinas treated them as distinct predicates, as do most Roman Catholics. Most Protestants have not. Thus, it would seem that the target of Carter’s article is not the broad Christian tradition, nor the prevailing tradition of American Christianity (Protestantism), but the tendencies in modern-day Roman Catholicism. Ironically, given the rhetoric from rightwing Roman Catholics today, the solution to modern liberalism’s enforced egalitarianism is not “based Catholicism” but classical Protestantism—the religion of our American fathers.
Natural Equality
I will begin with the concept of “natural equality.” This is widely affirmed in the Christian tradition in various forms. I’ll present the view most proximate to early modern liberalism, since that form of natural equality seems to be in the blast radius of Carter’s critique. In political thought, “natural equality” referred to the relationship between fellow man in his pre-political state. He is not free from the natural law of God, but he is free from the commands of fellow men. That is, he is not by pure nature subjected to another’s command by virtue of his nature. Political authority is not native or original to anyone such that he can justly command and punish disobedience in a state of nature. Nor is there a natural duty for the others to obey. Put differently, while one might be in fact superior regarding leadership capability, and therefore more fit to lead, there is no ought of original nature such that one must submit to that person. In that sense, all men are naturally equal.
This follows the scholastic distinction between vis indicativa and vis praecetiva. One man might be superior to others regarding natural capabilities, and the others would do well to follow him, recognizing by reason the fittingness to follow. But the naturally superior has no pre-consensual natural right to command or punish. The power to command originates in the command of God, for conscience is bound only to God. The ought to submit comes from divine authorization, which dictates that superiors are to be vicars of divine rule in civil institutions. But superiority itself is not a brute fact originating from adventitious divine command; superiority is natural and originates in the natural differences of man.
Moreover, man naturally comes to institute and submit to civil rulers through processes of consent. As Turretin states, “Men are born…for the good of society (of which there is by nature in them an earnest desire).”[10] This is akin to men and women marrying. No woman is born by pure nature into a marriage—into submission and marital duty—with some man, but marriage naturally arises, given human nature. The same is true of civil society. So, by original nature, man is born free and equal, but by his nature, he comes to form civil society in which some rule and others are ruled. And just as in marriage, those most suitable to rule by nature ought to rule. Hence, equality and hierarchical difference are acknowledged and are perfectly compatible—natural equality and natural superiority are reconciled. This explains why Althusius can say, “It is inborn to the more powerful and prudent to dominate and rule weaker men, just as it is also considered inborn for inferiors to submit,” while also stating that “the superior is the prefect of the community appointed by the consent of the citizens.”[11]
The same reasoning applies to man’s social nature. Being born free and equal as an individual does not conflict with his fundamental social nature. Though we can find individualist accounts of consent in Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke, the standard position on political consent prior to and well after them was a more collective consent. (See e.g., Rutherford Lex, Rex, Question 1 and his references.) The people as such consent to their rulers, and they can rescind that authority (for just cause). Consent is a sort of “social fact” of a people. Furthermore, man’s social nature, in its purest form, is not egotistic. The impulse to society is not rooted in fear or mere personal utility, as we see in modern liberalism. Rather, the impulse is to be a “symbiote,” to use the language of Althusius, in a symbiosis— i.e., an irreducibly complex relationship between individual and society. By his nature, man is complete only when participating in and contributing to a social world.
The individual devotes himself to the good of the whole according to his abilities, while reaping the benefits of the whole. That is, the common good is composed of each communicating his natural and acquired gifts to the whole, forming a whole greater than its parts. The community is the very thing enabling the individual to have a distinct vocation—to have individuality. The individual is affirmed as an equal, being one part of the whole. But that sort of equality does not equalize the quality and quantity of his contribution. A ditch-digger provides a service, and he can be recognized and respected as such, but ditch-digging is not qualitatively equal in value, nor quantitatively equal in contribution, compared with a good civil ruler.
This is where moral equality is so important. Each is equally bound to contribute according to his abilities. Without moral equality, as to duty, it is not clear how a society of difference and hierarchy could work at all—without fear being the basis of rule. And that seems to be what Carter’s philosophy requires. There is no equal duty that the inferior submit to the superiors, nor any baseline rational soul across humanity for moral and reasoned hierarchical fellowship. It is a world of vis indicativa without vis praecetiva. There is no fides servanda est. In other words, the power to command is a brute fact of the strong over the weak, and the weak submit only by fear. There is no escaping the Hobbesian world of bellum omnium contra omnes. In Montesquieu’s analysis, this returns us to the reign of the Turks.
Moral Equality
Moral equality concerns man as a moral being. Men are morally equal not regarding equal potential to actualize good quantitatively and qualitatively. Those of superior abilities (whether natural or acquired) can, ordinarily, do more and greater good in the world. Rather, moral equality refers to man’s substantial nature, being different than the rest of their genus (viz., animal) in possessing a rational soul. Carter highlights several things that man shares with other animals, claiming similarity. But similarity was widely acknowledged, since man shares with other animals the same genus. Animals react to stimuli, think (in ways), decide upon things, store memory, experience desires and impulses, have social organization (even complex ones), and have a degree of ensoulment (anima). Man is an animal and thus shares with all animals what is essential to the genus and shares many accidental features with them. The question is not whether only humans have voluntary action but whether they alone possess knowledge of right and wrong and have moral choice. We all imply (at least) the latter. We do not morally condemn the vicious dog, but we do condemn the cruel man. And we ask for reasons from fellow man to justify their actions. Unlike lesser animals, the human animal exists in a plane or world of reasons for action.
Every member of the species “man” shares the capacity for rationality with the accompanied property of intelligible speech. We offer reasons for action. If human actions are instinct all the way down, then his acts are no different than those of lions, for which moral justification is irrelevant. And if lions are moral beings, then they deserve moral praise and blame. But even among the most advanced of non-human animals, there is little evidence that they have robust self-awareness, truth-conceptualization, self-narration, and abstract-thought capability. And much of their human-like intelligence is likely the product of training and conditioning, not natural capability in abstract reasoning or moral judgment.
At what point, descending on Carter’s spectrum of value, do we stop demanding reasons for action? That line would seem to determine the species of rational man. Are we to treat some humans as we would animals, not requiring of them moral justification? If we did, how could they be under law, even a different law from the others? After all, law requires promulgation via speech and apprehension. How can we punish them for disobedience when they cannot receive law? The ability to receive and be under law, properly speaking, requires understanding, will, and rationality. There is no “law” governing the lions in a zoo. So, the fact that Carter wants all humans to be under law, even under different bodies of law suitable to their value-groupings, requires that he recognizes a fundamental equality shared across humanity and a logical species called man. If all men but no non-human animals ought to be under some body of law, then man is a distinct species of animal. Carter’s philosophical system requires some form of moral equality and some baseline human rationality.
Moreover, Carter never mentions human capability regarding religion. Man is the only religious animal. The ability to acknowledge and worship God is the highest capacity that an earthly being can possess, accompanied by the greatest duty. Calvin says that our ability and duty to acknowledge and worship God “is our principal distinction from the brutes.”[12] Thus, by this fact alone, man is higher than all other animals in dignity. This is why the Christian is committed to equality of substance—the common possession of faculties and capacities that distinguish men from creatures in their genus. Carter would deny this, it seems, because there are many low-intelligence humans who display limited abilities regarding abstract thought. To be sure, I do not doubt that intelligence varies. But if men of every human intelligence level can acknowledge and worship God, then degrees of intelligence (as measured today) are not the measure of substantive sameness. If all men can truly worship God, then they all share the specific difference distinguishing them from all non-human animals. But Christianity has spread around the world, among nearly all people groups. Ergo…
Moral Difference
Moral equality means that all are under the same fundamental moral law. Thus, all ought to follow the same moral principles. But as principles, they do not in themselves prescribe particular action. They must be applied according to the circumstances of each individual, family, and nation. Adding evil to man, it follows that wide differences in moral action across people and peoples should not surprise us.
No one believed that moral equality regarding moral principles makes all cultures morally equal. Aquinas represents the consensus (ST I-II.94.4):
we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions…it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature.
This view is repeated by treatises on law in the late medieval and early modern periods, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. Reformed theologian Franciscus Junius said that the natural law “has not been equally perceived by all in every age.”[13] Another Reformed theologian, Girolama Zanchi, wrote that “we see among different peoples that some are wiser, more devoted to justice and honesty and more zealous for God” and “Even if natural law is inscribed on everyone’s heart, still God usually inscribes it according to his own desire unequally; in some more deeply and profoundly, in other less deeply and profoundly” and “natural law has not been written in every person’s heart equally, but more in some and less in others.”[14] Jurist Matthew Hale writes that “many people and nations have been overgrown with evil customs and barbarism, that they have imbued their very human nature to a degree not much superior to beasts….[they have] degraded themselves of the actual dignity of human nature.”[15] Althusius, Turretin, and others echo the same.
As Pindar said, “custom is the king of all”; and as Herodotus concluded, “all people have strong attachments to their own customs,” preferring their own over others across generations (Histories, 3.38). These customs, whether good or bad, endure for centuries, even after migration—blurring the line between nature and custom. Whether group behavior is by physis or nomos is, in many cases, practically irrelevant in our moral evaluation. Custom is second nature.
The most common opinion, shared by nearly everyone prior to the last several decades, is that some nations are inferior to others, even when comparing pagan nations. Further, their degradation makes them, in a way, less human in action (though not in substance)—more morally akin to non-rational animals. But their rationality makes them worse than any animal, for they abuse reason to greater evil by placing it under the reigns of evil passion. Being rational animals, they are more capable of cruelty than any other animals.
III. Dignity
Image of God
The image of God has been variously described over millennia, and in recent times, many theologians tend to reduce it to a status of man in relation to fellow man, a fiat stamp of “dignity” ensuring human rights and equal treatment. But most dead theologians, not denying its social role, emphasize the faculties or “gifts” (natural and supernatural) that God equipped in man. That is, man images God by the sort of creature he is—a being with a rational soul, equipped with understanding and will, and capable of moral action. Man is “like” God, though far below him. The telos of it all is acknowledging and worshipping God and attaining a heavenly end.
Our likeness to God pertains to what man can do. He can exercise practical reasoning and then act morally. Man has dignity regarding his equipped faculties, being closer to God in his nature. But he can also act in dignity—he can act like God on earth. Human dignity is not merely a passive status before fellow man but an indicator of a higher nature in relation to other creatures. It is the mark of elevation. Man surpasses animals in dignity by nature, given the composition of his creation. And man can act in dignity above all other animals.
We can speak, therefore, of a passive dignity and an active dignity. A man is both human and can act humanly. It follows that a man can act below his dignity, falling into behavior more akin to the non-rational beasts of his genus. Just because man is human does not necessarily mean that he acts humanly. Calvin said it straightforwardly: “To walk after the flesh, is to be given up to the flesh, like brute animals, who are not led by reason and judgment, but have the natural desire of their flesh as their chief guide.” Such people act “like brute beasts; for they are immersed in their lusts: in short, they are unworthy to be called men.”[16]
To be sure, passive dignity is real, affording man certain natural claims against others (i.e., natural right to life). Still, active dignity is more relevant to one’s status in society. Those who act less humanly in society, or fail to practice active dignity, receive more civil restraint than those who do exercise active dignity. For such people, there is no natural right to society’s resources beyond basic human needs and whatever is deemed prudent for their potential reformation. Some people, though intrinsically capable of active dignity, require a legal regime of fear to keep them orderly.
Christian Dignity
Reformed theologians would often distinguish the image of God into two parts: the essential and the perfective. The essential includes reason, understanding, and will, pertaining largely to earthly things. The perfective image orients man heavenward and thereby orders man in his being unto holiness and to the heavenly kingdom. Both parts are necessary for righteousness, holiness, and rectitude. Upon losing the perfective (which is logically accidental to man as such), man is rendered unrighteous and vicious habits are introduced, which wreak havoc on what remains. Man remains man, but he is analogous to a rotten apple. Only by God’s mercy is man left capable of civil society and some civil justice. Pagan civil virtue remains possible. Man has lost the principal part of human dignity, but not all his dignity. Thus, he can still, in an earthly and outward sense, act humanly.
The Christian has this perfective dignity restored to him, having the righteousness of Christ infused in him.[17] Redeemed man is re-equipped with what was lost, though it is now possessed supernaturally. This means that the Christian—who worships God in Christ—has higher dignity than the unredeemed. In this state of grace, even those earthly virtues are of greater dignity because the Christian performs them to the glory of God in Christ.
It is important to emphasize that grace restores; it does not replace the nature of man. The Christian remains a human being; indeed, he is more human, since he acts according to the original nature of man in Christ. But it restores each man according to his potential. The obese do not suddenly become fit, nor do the short become tall. Nor do you get a miraculous IQ jump or become an exceptional leader. Even regarding sanctification, while all can be equally sanctified before God, this equality does not make everyone’s work in the world qualitatively or qualitatively equal. The godly ditch-digger and the godly magistrate are equally godly before God, but their work on earth is not equal. Nor do both ordinarily deserve equal praise and rewards.
Civil Dignity
Pertaining to earthly vocations, Christians for millennia affirmed that some have more dignity than others. Civil magistrates were more like God in exercising their office, since they could effectively create law and punish violators. They are vicars of God, higher (in the Protestant tradition) than even church ministers. Calvin said, “When good magistrates rule, we see God, as it were, near us, and governing us by means of those whom he hath appointed.”[18] Again, this was not some brute fact by divine decree. Rather, the nature of the office and its powers in action confer it: “The image of God shines forth in them when they execute judgment and justice,” Calvin wrote.[19] Given the nature of the office, magistracy is higher in dignity than the rest. Samuel Rutherford said, “the king hath that same remainder of the image of God that any private man hath; and something more, he hath a politic resemblance of the King of heavens, being a little god, and so is above any one man” (Lex, Rex).
The doctrine of the image of God bears little resemblance to modern political doctrines. There is an element of equality in the doctrine, since all men retain passive dignity and thereby deserve our benevolence and beneficence. But modern notions of equality and dignity do not follow from it. Indeed, since the image refers to faculties for action and since man often fails to act morally, the doctrine explains the fact of inequality and moral difference, and it refutes modern ideas of equal treatment. The doctrine of the image of God actually justifies civil hierarchy.
One might argue that I’ve properly demonstrated my conclusions and yet say, “even if there is no logical necessity, the ideas of natural equality, moral equality, and the imago dei will naturally lead in time to radical equality; its abuse is historically inevitable.” I agree that such language has been used to justify perverse forms of equality, largely (in my estimation) to launder modern philosophical notions. But I could just as easily turn it back on Carter, who insists that his “return” to pre-Christian social foundations does not necessitate “the might-makes-right of the Roman era, with humans treated as property, slave girls as rape toys, and highways lined with the crucified.” But it did historically lead to that, and much more: human sacrifice and other atrocities. My political thought is rooted in millennia of theory and practice. His is more like, true paganism has never been tried.
IV. Conclusion
The ideas that Carter critiques are real and powerful today. Some Christians perpetuate them. But they are not ideas of the historic Christian tradition, nor do they resemble the political practice of Christendom. His target is a Christianized modern liberalism in which Christian language is packaged to deliver modern liberal ideas. Today, “image of God” is just the dignity of modernity. “Equality” is the equity of postmodernism. “Infinite dignity” is an unmoored Roman Catholic “development”.
But the answer to equality-talk is not abandoning fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith. The answer is understanding them. We can coherently affirm both natural and moral equality and civil and social inequality. And we ought to, because equality is the bedrock of a hierarchical society—where each has the equal moral demand to work according to his abilities to the benefit of all, led by those most suited to lead. But natural and moral equality do not require that all are equally praised, nor that each person has “limitless value,” nor that all have the same potential, nor that bad behavior is excused or blamed elsewhere, nor that resentment and subversion are tolerated. The image of God means that fallen man will act below his dignity, like animals, and ought to be restrained by civil authority. Men must be governed, some more than others.
How we go about praising and blaming, promoting and restraining, and erecting systems of inequality requires prudence. My defense of inequality here is not a defense of Carter’s prescriptions, including the idea of different law regimes for different peoples under the same state. My purpose was simply to explain Christian anthropology and how Christian doctrine explains the fact of inequality and justifies a broad principle of social inequality. I agree with Carter that equality-talk is a problem, but the Christian tradition has better answers to the problems.
Image: Jan Griffier I (c.1652-1718), View from One Tree Hill, The Queen’s House and the Royal Observatory. Wikimedia Commons.
[1] John Adams, Letter to Charles Adams, 24 February 1794.
[2] I address both in chapter three of my book, The Case for Christian Nationalism (Canon Press, 2022).
[3] See Matthew Hale, Of the Law of Nature, 42.
[4] See Digest 50.17.32 [Ulp. 43 ad Sab.].
[5] John Calvin, Commentary on Numbers 3:5.
[6] John Calvin, Commentary on Malachi 1:2-6.
[7] Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 11.2.19.
[8] John Calvin Institutes of the Christian Religion, II.8.39.
[9] Jonathan Edwards wrote, “The love, honor, and obedience of Christ towards God, has infinite value, from the excellency and dignity of the person in whom these qualifications were inherent: and the reason why we needed a person of infinite dignity to obey for us, was because of our infinite comparative meanness, who had disobeyed, whereby our disobedience was infinitely aggravated: we needed one, the worthiness of whose obedience, might be answerable to the unworthiness of our disobedience; and therefore needed one who was as great and worthy, as we were unworthy.”
[10] Francis Turretin Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 11.1.16.
[11] Johannes Althusius, Politica, I.38 and V.22.
[12] John Calvin, Commentary on Isaiah 44.9.
[13] Franciscus Junius, Mosaic Polity, 45.
[14] Zanchi, On the Law in General, 16, 21, 22.
[15] Matthew Hale, Of the Law of Nature, 47.
[16] John Calvin, Commentary on 2 Peter 2:10 and Commentary on Zeph. 3:4.
[17] Reformed theologians did not reject “infusion” of righteousness, as some believe today. Turretin writes, “Just as Christ sustains a twofold relation to us of surety and head (of surety, to take away the guilt of sin by a payment made for it; of head, to take away its power and corruption by the efficacy of the Spirit), so in a twofold way Christ imparts his blessings to us, by a forensic imputation, and a moral and internal infusion” (IET 16.3.6).
[18] John Calvin, Commentary on Isaiah 22:21.
[19] John Calvin, Commentary on Jeremiah 22:15.