The Independence of the Church

The Christian Commitments of the State in a Secular Republic

Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801–1876) was a Dutch Reformed Protestant historian and politician who founded the political party Abraham Kuyper would eventually join and serve in as Prime Minister.

Against Political Atheism

Numerous themes show up repeatedly in Prinsterer’s writings. Two central ones were the danger of the revolutionary ideology unleashed by the French Revolution and the relationship between church and state. These two themes were integrally connected in Prinsterer’s mind: he saw the radical separation of church and state in France as a great peril to the survival of the church in that nation (or any that followed its example).

Prinsterer summed up his basic position on the relationship between church and state in his published lectures entitled Unbelief and Revolution (p. 32, n. 22) like this:

Church and State should not be separated but kept distinct, united in joint consultations from a position of mutual independence . . . . If the Christian church loses it priority, freedom of conscience is without defenses against the intolerance of unbelief. Unbelief becomes the civic religion of a secular state.

Later in this same work he refers to the default position of France as one of state-sanctioned “political atheism” (Unbelief and Revolution, p. 33). France, despite the claims of some at the time, was not a neutral ground on which all religions could compete, but itself had an official religion, albeit an atheistic one. All state institutions (including primary education) were forced to deny the truths of Christianity. In France, “no positive religion whatsoever,” he continued, “shall be tolerated in opposition to the requirements of revolutionary sociability”(Unbelief and Revolution, p. 103). This is not at all dissimilar to what we see in Western nations today regarding moral issues like abortion and sexuality. Religion may be tolerated as long as it remains a purely inward and private affair, but if at any point it threatens the (sexual) revolutionary sociability an attempt will be made to suppress it ruthlessly.

Prinsterer believed firmly that church and state were divine institutions with distinct spheres of authority. The church does not have the right to usurp the power of the state, nor the state the power of the church. Distinction does not entail radical separation, however.

On the Necessity of Political Prudence

Although maintaining such a distinction, Prinsterer’s articulation of the ideal relationship between church and state is not wholly compatible with the contemporary political theory of liberalism. In another work, entitled Christian Political Action in an Age of Revolution, he develops an additional insight of relevance to ongoing discussions in Christian “post-liberal” circles about the relations of church and state.

In this book Prinsterer says emphatically, in response to a critique: “I am an ardent opponent of the separation of church and state, though not as ardent as Mr. Trottet imagines.” What Prinsterer takes issue with in his opponent’s criticism is, as he says, that Trottet advocates “an absolute separation,” of church and state “as a universal truth . . . thus raising it to the rank of an article of faith” (Age of Revolution, p. 21). In his critic’s understanding any formal relationship between church and state is ruled illegitimate as a matter of absolute and inflexible moral principle.

This is similar to the position of many today, even among Protestants who come from a tradition that for centuries vigorously supported a specific kind of formal connection of church and state. It is one thing to say that it is unwise to seek such a relationship today; it is quite another thing to say that that position is categorically wrong. The Reformers and their heirs and not infallible, but one does need to grapple with their actual arguments on church and state instead of superficially dismissing them.

Here is where I think Prinsterer is most interesting and potentially helpful. He argues that there are times when the very “interests of religious freedom” (here understood as the freedom of true Christians to worship freely) necessitate restricting “the exercise of [some] political rights . . .  to members of the State Church” (Age of Revolution, pp. 21-22). As examples of such times he lists the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572) and the Catholic League (1576), both of which set out to murder Protestants and eliminate Protestantism in France, as well as the violent attacks on Protestants during the Thirty-Years War and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), which had granted Protestants toleration in France since 1598. Prinsterer’s argument is that in those times of mortal peril to Protestants it would have been suicidal to grant Catholics complete political freedom and then simply “rely on the scrupulous honesty and good graces of the duly grateful Catholics” to prevent further atrocities (Age of Revolution, p. 22). Moving to England, he asks whether “William III [was] mistaken when, called upon to lay the foundations of a genuine liberty, he refused to be taken in by the Stuart’s ardour for toleration[,]” which, Prinsterer contends, would have simply been a pretext to crush genuine Protestant religious liberty.

Prinsterer’s entire discussion is based on the premise that it is right for the state to ensure that genuine Protestantism is at the very least protected and allowed to flourish unmolested by external threats. This, coincidentally, is the exact position of the American revisions to the Westminster Confession of Faith 20.4:

[A]s nursing fathers, it is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the church of our common Lord, without giving the preference to any denomination of Christians above the rest, in such a manner that all ecclesiastical persons whatever shall enjoy the full, free, and unquestioned liberty of discharging every part of their sacred functions, without violence or danger.

Prinsterer insisted that such protection was in certain times not possible when full political rights were granted to certain religious groups. If such groups were to use their political rights to assault genuine Christians then those rights would have to be rescinded. Prinsterer sums his position up like this: “Force of circumstance has in the past made the union of church and state necessary and advantageous, and may yet do so again in the future. The first principle of ecclesiastical law is not separation but independence” (Age of Revolution, p. 22, emphasis original).

The Independence of the Church

It is at this point that Prinsterer’s argument takes a new direction. Though rejecting a categorical separation of church and state, what matters even more for Prinsterer is the principle of the church’s independence. Spiritual independence is the notion that the church must resist all attempts, no matter where they originate, to prevent it from faithfully carrying out its divinely ordained ministry. “When it is faithful in this duty” of preserving its independence, “the benefits of union [of church and state] can be appreciated and, if and when necessary,” the union of church and state “will be abandoned . . . in the interests of truth” (Age of Revolution, p. 22). That is to say, as long as the church’s independence is preserved, there are times when circumstances will dictate that a union of church and state is to be rejected, even if it is legitimate in principle. To pursue such a union may in fact lead to the destruction of the spiritual independence of the church.

“Under no circumstances,” Prinsterer said of the situation in the Netherlands of his day, “am I aiming for the restoration of a privileged [state] church” (Age of Revolution, p. 23). He continues:

For the Reformed Church in particular, I have long sought genuine separation, that is, the emancipation of a church from its miserable subjection to arbitrary administrative power. No more caesaropapism, no more jus in sacra, especially no more civil religion; nothing but a right to supervise and duty to protect (Age of Revolution, p. 23).

Prinsterer’s reason for arguing for the possibility of a connection of church and state in principle and yet emphatically rejecting it in practice was the condition of the Dutch church at the time, which he saw as being prevented from carrying out its divinely ordained ministry by the state itself.

“What I want,” he writes, “is a secular or lay state,” by which he means a state not subservient to the church, “but one still Christian, not a state that refuses to recognize divine authority, with church and state as distinct entities acting—each in its own sphere and in concert—for the advancement of the nation’s best interests” (Age of Revolution, p. 23).

Conclusion: The Christian Commitments of the State in a Secular Republic

I have only described Prinsterer’s views in this article. Whether they are faithful to biblical teaching and natural law is another matter. But I find the distinction he makes extremely helpful in evaluating contemporary claims about how church and state should be related. While I think the Reformers should have granted more religious freedom to all genuine Christians, and somewhat less authority for the state to intervene in ecclesiastical matters, their articulation of the state’s mandate with regard to religion is impressive. Even so, Prinsterer provides an important qualification: the Reformer’s view, even if wholly correct in principle, should not be applied inflexibly, regardless of circumstances (the Reformers themselves were aware of the need to make such concessions to the demands of prudence). As Prinsterer contends, there are times when such an application would actually subvert the very cause of Christian religious liberty. Such seems fairly obviously to be the case in American today as well. Does anyone, even the most ardent supporter or religious establishment, think it would be good for Christians if the contemporary American state began authoritatively directing ecclesiastical affairs, even to the slightest degree? I doubt it. But avoiding religious establishment does not preclude sentiments like that expressed recently by Al Mohler:

I want to maximize the Christian commitments of the state. I call that ‘acknowledgment.’ I’m not claiming that every citizen will be a confessing Christian. but that does not mean they are not obligated to the acknowledgment of the Christian structure of this civilization.

This reminds me of the words of Charles Hodge, expressing a sentiment not perceived as particularly radical at the time (early 1870s):

The people of this country being rational, moral, and religious beings, the government must be administered on the principles of reason, morality, and religion. By a like necessity of right, the people being Christians and Protestants, the government must be administered according to the principles of Protestant Christianity.

In the end, what matters most in thinking through the relationship of church and state is not inflexible, technical principles about their relationship, but the underlying truths that the Reformers themselves cared most about: the spiritual health of the church and its freedom to proclaim the gospel faithfully in the world, and a state that supports, rather than undermines, these aims.

Image: The Begijnhof with the English Reformed Church, Amsterdam, Jan ten Compe (1713-1761), oil on canvas.

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