On Differences and Potential Misunderstandings
Presbyterians have long debated the precise relationship that should exist between church and state. The debate continues in the present, being centered primarily on certain differences between the teaching on the civil magistrate in the original version of the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647) and the American revisions to the Confession (1788).
There are currently two main views on how to understand the relationship between these two versions:
- The American revisions, though eliminating some of the language of the original, do not contradict its teaching or disallow someone to hold to the original version. This view has been articulated by Presbyterian Church in America (PCA) Teaching Elder James Baird.
- The American revisions, while not repudiating all of the original teaching on the civil magistrate, do explicitly disallow some of it. This view has been argued by PCA Teaching Elder Kevin DeYoung.
Why the difference? It mostly centers on what is stated in section 3 of Chapter 23 in the two versions of the Confession.
The original version says this:
The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the Word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven: yet he hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire; that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed; all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed; and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better effecting whereof, he hath power to call synods, to be present at them, and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God.
The American revisions wholly rewrite this chapter as follows:
Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the Word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven; or, in the least, interfere in matters of faith. Yet, as nursing fathers, it is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the church of our common Lord, without giving the preference to any denomination of Christians above the rest, in such a manner that all ecclesiastical persons whatever shall enjoy the full, free, and unquestioned liberty of discharging every part of their sacred functions, without violence or danger. And, as Jesus Christ hath appointed a regular government and discipline in his church, no law of any commonwealth should interfere with, let, or hinder, the due exercise thereof, among the voluntary members of any denomination of Christians, according to their own profession and belief. It is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the person and good name of all their people, in such an effectual manner as that no person be suffered, either upon pretense of religion or of infidelity, to offer any indignity, violence, abuse, or injury to any other person whatsoever: and to take order, that all religious and ecclesiastical assemblies be held without molestation or disturbance.
DeYoung’s main point regarding the original version is that the magistrate is required to do the following:
- Take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the Church.
- That the truth of God be kept pure and entire.
- That all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed.
- That all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline be prevented or reformed.
- That all the ordinances of God be duly settled, administered, and observed.
In other words, the magistrate has a responsibility regarding church unity, doctrine, and worship. For DeYoung, this responsibility grants the magistrate power that only properly belongs to the church. It is easy to understand how these phrases could be interpreted in that way. There may, however, be a problem with this interpretation.
The Scottish Presbyterian minister and seminary professor Robert Shaw’s (1795 – 1863) influential commentary on the Westminster Confession presents a helpful statement of the potential difficulty with this understanding, one that could provide some useful clarity for the current debate, or that at least might further the discussion in helpful ways. Shaw (as all Scots did at the time) subscribed to the original version of the Confession, yet he begins his exposition of 23.3 by noting that, contrary to the assertions of some, the original Confession was not Erastian (p. 314):
In opposition to Erastian principles, according to which the government and discipline of the Church are devolved upon the civil magistrate, they [= the Westminster Confession] declare that the magistrate may not take upon himself either the ministerial dispensation of the Word and sacraments, or any part of the government of the Church.
The very first sentence in 23.3 in both the original and the American versions of the Confession makes this clear: “The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the Word and sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven.”
What the original version of 23.3 does teach, according to Shaw, is that it is the magistrate’s “duty to employ his influence and authority, in every way competent to him, for the good of the Church, and the advancement of the interests of true religion.” What Shaw means by “competent” is key: a magistrate can act for the good of the Church and in the advancement of the interests of true religion in legitimate or illegitimate ways. Just because the end is good, in other words, does not mean that all means toward that end will be good. If the magistrate attempts to meddle in the internal governance of the church, this would be an illegitimate means toward what might still be said to be a legitimate end, “the advancement of the interests of true religion.” In this regard, Shaw argues that some in the Church of Scotland in his day wrongly took the Confession to be granting the magistrate “a controlling power in and over the Church” with the result that “the civil courts [interfered] in matters strictly ecclesiastical” (p. 314). Shaw, quoting Thomas M’Crie, notes that the Westminster Divines themselves refused “to concede that power to [Parliament]” and therefore were not allowed by Parliament to establish presbyteries and synods in England (pp. 314–5).
If the magistrate may not interfere in matters strictly ecclesiastical, what does the Confession call him positively to do? Shaw writes that “the proper and immediate end of civil government . . . is the temporal good of men, yet the advancement of religion is an end which civil rulers, in the exercise or their civil authority, are bound to aim at” (p. 316).
This is a point on which there is agreement between the original and the American versions. Both versions, for example, insist that the magistrate is “to maintain piety, justice, and peace, according to the wholesome laws of each commonwealth” (23.2). Though rewriting the language of 23.3 completely, the American revision nonetheless insists that “as nursing fathers, it is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the church of our common Lord, without giving the preference to any denomination of Christians above the rest . . .” (23.3). All Protestants, in other words, should be granted religious freedom by a magistrate who has a duty to attend to their spiritual well-being, though without interfering in the internal governance of these churches. Interestingly, DeYoung recognizes that the revised Confession only grants religious freedom to Protestants, but believes that these protections should be extended beyond what the American revision calls for:
I would argue that the principles of 1788 regarding the rights of conscience and liberty of worship should be extended to non-Christians in our day, but I grant that [the American revisers] did not conceive of the religious pluralism we now have in America.
The current debate about 23.3 centers on whether the original Confession argued for more than a generally supportive role of the magistrate with regard to the church. DeYoung believes that it does. Shaw does not (pp. 316–7):
According to our Confession, the civil magistrate must not assume a lordly supremacy over the Church; for ‘there is no other head of the Church, but the Lord Jesus Christ (Chapter 25, section 6).
[The magistrate] must not interfere with [the church’s] internal government; for ‘the Lord Jesus, as king and head of his Church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of Church-officers, distinct from the civil magistrate’; and ‘to these officers the keys of the kingdom of heaven are committed’ (Chapter 30, section 1, 2).
[The magistrate] must not, as a magistrate, sustain himself a public judge of the true or false religion so as to dictate to his subjects in matters purely religious; for ‘it belongeth to synods and councils ministerially to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience’ (Chapter 31, section 3).
Put simply, DeYoung believes that the original Confession granted authority to the magistrate to interfere in the internal governance of the church: “the Westminster Confession requires the civil magistrate to exercise a coercive power in matters of faith.” Shaw has shown, however, that such coercive power is ruled out by the original Confession itself. One limitation in much of the present debate is that the focus has been almost entirely on Chapter 23 (on the civil magistrate), potentially neglecting other relevant (and vital) teaching throughout the rest of the Confession. This is all additional to the prohibition in Chapter 23.3 of the magistrate not “assum[ing] to himself the administration of the Word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven,” the power of the keys meaning “the ordinary power of government, in the administration of the affairs of the Church . . .” (Shaw, p. 317). “[W]hen civil rulers assume a proper jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, which the Confession has denied to them,” Shaw writes, “their proceedings must be inconsistent at once with the Word of God and the law of the land” (p. 318).
Shaw sums up his position like this: in the original Confession certain “matters specified are objects which [the civil magistrate] is entitled and bound to aim at, and to effect by such method[s] as are competent to him, without invading the jurisdiction of the church” (p. 318).
On this understanding, “matters competent to him” in the original Confession would include the magistrate’s responsibility regarding church unity, doctrine, heresy, and worship. However, he only has a supportive role to play regarding such things. This approach only contradicts the American revisions if one understands the original version to state that the magistrate is “bound to aim at” matters strictly related to the internal governance of the church by exercising a coercive power over the church’s deliberations on these matters. Some have understood the original Confession in this way, and if one does so understand it as an office bearer in the PCA, he would have to seek an exception to the American version of 23.3 on this particular point. I believe, however, that Shaw has made his case that the Confession as a whole argues against this understanding.
A difficulty still remains. If Shaw is correct that the magistrate has not been given authority by God to interfere in matters of church government, what exactly is within the magistrate’s “competence” (to use Shaw’s language) with regard to religion? What, in other words, should the magistrate do regarding these matters? It is here that I think the American revisions are helpful. Even if Shaw is correct in his reading of the original Confession, I would argue that the original wording could easily be read as if it granted the magistrate authority to rule over the internal governance of the church. Shaw himself notes that some within the Church of Scotland and the Scottish government in his day tried to apply the Confession in precisely this way, which led Shaw and others to take their churches out of the national church. The American version of 23.3 can be understood as a clarification of a potential ambiguity, especially by specifying that the magistrate not being given “the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven” means that it is not to “interfere in matters of faith” in the sense of attempting to rule on matters of strictly ecclesiastical provenance.
Neither version of the Confession allows the civil magistrate to take to himself the keys of the kingdom, to exercise the authority only given by God to the church. I think the wording of the American revision is clearer on this point. It makes this clarification, however, without changing the original mandate for the civil magistrate—though a separate and unique authority instituted by God—to be broadly supportive of the work of all Protestant churches.
Image Credit: Unsplash
