An Introduction
In his Bondage of the Will, Martin Luther famously thanked Erasmus for hitting upon soteriology as the “essential issue” of the Reformation debates. While Luther was right to identify soteriology as the major substantive distinction between the Reformers and Rome, I would propose that epistemology is perhaps even more fundamental, given that soteriology is necessarily derived from some epistemological principles. Both Roman Catholics and Reformed have a distinct epistemological or hermeneutical principle from which their theological corpus derives, and these principles are irreconcilable to one another. Acknowledging this divergence is necessary and beneficial for all those who wish to have fruitful dialogue and debate with one another across the divide.
I don’t mean to suggest that epistemology is the only thing that matters, since Rome and the Protestants have significant substantive differences on many doctrines, especially soteriology. Yet it is beneficial to probe their fundamentally diverging axioms and methods of determining what is legitimate and reliable Christian doctrine and ethics. Since the Roman Catholics and Protestants reach different conclusions about what Christians ought to believe and how and to what extent the conscience of believers can be bound, it is helpful to understand how we reach those diverging conclusions. A key question is: how can we know what we must know?
Infallible Magisterium
The Romanist epistemology begins from the assumption that divine revelation requires an enduring, infallible magisterium and that God has indeed provided such a magisterium in the visible institution of the Roman Catholic Church. In the Vatican’s Catechism of the Catholic Church (1993), the section defining the magisterium (85–86) explains it thus:
85. “The task of giving an authentic interpretation of the Word of God, whether in its written form or in the form of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living teaching office of the Church alone. Its authority in this matter is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ.” This means that the task of interpretation has been entrusted to the bishops in communion with the successor of Peter, the Bishop of Rome.
86. “Yet this Magisterium is not superior to the Word of God, but is its servant. It teaches only what has been handed on to it. At the divine command and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it listens to this devotedly, guards it with dedication and expounds it faithfully. All that it proposes for belief as being divinely revealed is drawn from this single deposit of faith.”
In this view, Christ instituted His church through the apostles and their apostolic successors, the bishops. Christ gave his church the authority to identify the Word of God (i.e., the canon), teach it to Christians, and interpret what it means. The church is infallible across the successive human generations so that the ends of God’s revelation will not fail. As the Catechism puts it, “In order to preserve the Church in the purity of the faith handed on by the apostles, Christ who is the Truth willed to confer on her a share in his own infallibility … It is this Magisterium’s task to preserve God’s people from deviations and defections and to guarantee them the objective possibility of professing the true faith without error” (889 – 890). This infallibility in defining doctrine is possessed by the papal office and by ecumenical councils (891).
This is an epistemological assumption because – prior to any doctrines of soteriology, Mariology, or sacraments – we have a Romanist principle of how we come to know what we need to know for salvation, doctrine, and the life of the church. Everything else in Roman Catholicism is downstream from this because in every point of scriptural interpretation and doctrine, the magisterium guides our reading of the Scriptures, teaches us what to believe, and even interprets the contested passages of Scripture for us. If a text of Scripture seems to conflict with the church’s teaching (as many Protestants argue), one must go to the infallible magisterium to learn the proper explanation for the passages in question which can resolve or explain that perceived tension or contradiction.
To be clear, this is not seen as a problem for those who embrace the Romanist epistemology and hermeneutics. If I believe that God gave the magisterium to guide us into truth and protect us from error, then why should I trust my individual interpretation of biblical passages over the interpretation provided to me by the bishops and the pope? Any time I could potentially find a biblical passage which might contradict a Roman dogma, the magisterium can tell me how to understand that passage in a way that is coherent with the Roman system of doctrine.
If I relied on the infallibility of the magisterium, then I could trust their interpretations of the Scriptures for me in a way that would resolve all my problems with the various Roman doctrines—the penitential system, purgatory, sacerdotalism, seven sacraments, clerical celibacy, images, prayers to the saints—which seem prima facie unsupported by the biblical texts. If one accepts the infallible magisterium, one can accept all the rest. Even if some of the doctrines – such as the Marian dogmas – seem very far-fetched and unmoored from the biblical texts, I could eventually accept them if I indeed trusted that God gave infallibility to the magisterium to guide my otherwise feeble and fallible interpretations of His revelation.
To the doubtful, the magisterium is the impediment; yet to the Romanist, the magisterium is that which enables the rest. The Roman Catholics argue that an infallible magisterium, as a conduit of the Holy Spirit’s perennial work in the church, is the basis for unity and continuity in the church, which is obviously attractive but simultaneously implausible to Protestants.
Sola Scriptura
The Reformed epistemology and hermeneutics, on the other hand, does not assume that there is an infallible magisterium in the church. To be clear, this does not mean the Reformed reject the visible institution of the church, nor do they deny hierarchy in the church, nor do they believe that all interpretations of Scripture and doctrine are equally plausible and valid. The Reformed simply deny there is an infallible ecclesiastical institution. We assume that Scripture is fundamental, and that the church must derive its organization, leadership, and hierarchy from Scripture (hence the Reformed rejection of papacy and episcopacy; some Protestants preserve bishops, but that is not my concern to address here). The root Reformed epistemological assumption is sola Scriptura. Given that this is often misunderstood, it is helpful to clarify its meaning by reference to Reformed confessions, such as the Westminster Confession of Faith (1646):
The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men. All things in Scripture are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all: yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation, are so clearly propounded, and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them (WCF 1.6 – 7; I have quoted here from the Westminster Confession, but similar language and attestations can be found across all the Reformed confessions and catechisms).
The Reformed believe that God’s foreordained plan of redemption will not fail, and God will establish and preserve His church. However, God does this by preserving His Word and illuminating it by His Spirit to believers, rather than by granting to us an infallible magisterium. Scripture is the only infallible authority which can bind the conscience of Christians. Furthermore, the “infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself: and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold but one), it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly” (WCF 1.9). When interpretations are doubtful or contested, the recourse is to explain – to the best extent possible – the original meaning of the passages, reliant upon grammatical-historical interpretation of the original languages, and judging obscurity by clarity (not vice versa).
While the Reformers never wanted to usher in radical individualism, we do find less deference to visible authorities in the Reformed epistemology than in the Roman Church because believers are encouraged to read the Scriptures for themselves and examine the Scriptures as Bereans to “see if these things [be] so” (Acts 17:11). One cannot automatically trust church leaders, tradition, or institutions, even as we nevertheless still hold tradition, confessions, and teachers in great esteem. We must hold our teachers and pastors to account by the Word of God, for what is most biblical is most authoritative. By good hermeneutical principles, we can indeed make determinations about which interpretations are better and thus more authoritative than others (contrary to what many Romanists allege about Protestants). However, in making these judgments, we must have recourse to what is most biblical and most reasonable, rather than merely submitting to an ecclesiastical institution which definitively defines doctrine for us.
Both the Romanis and Protestant positions contain fundamental epistemological assumptions from which the rest of the respective system of doctrine derives. If we do not accept one another’s epistemological principles of authority, then understandably we cannot accept one another’s conclusions.
Demonstration?
Furthermore, these epistemological assumptions themselves appear to me to be ultimately indemonstrable – at least not demonstrable beyond all reasonable doubt. In the contest between whether we should (ultimately) trust the magisterium or the Scriptures alone, what evidence ought we to look for and provide? A Bible passage? The Romanists are fond of saying something akin to “The Bible doesn’t actually teach sola Scriptura”. No “smoking gun” Bible passage can be presented to them which can cause a problem to their system, if indeed there is an infallible magisterium telling them how to interpret that passage (presumably in a way that does not unseat their entire system of doctrine). No Bible passage says “trust the magisterium” – at least not that bluntly – and if one wants to make the argument that Scripture calls us to trust and obey the magisterium, one has to clear interpretive hurdles that are not immediately apparent. If Rome wants to argue from the authority entrusted to the apostles, she has to first demonstrate that everything said about the apostles and entrusted to the apostles carries on completely to the visible institution of the church which is Rome, and so on.
My point is simply that these interpretations of the biblical texts (e.g. Matt. 28:18-20; Mark 16:15-20; Luke 24:47-50; Jn. 20:21-23, 21:15-17) are not so obvious or irrefutable on their face that one could automatically embrace them unless we start by believing that the infallible magisterium will tell us how to interpret Scripture. If we start with the principle of infallible magisterium, we can then accept how the magisterium teaches us to interpret the disputed passages regarding apostolic authority and accordingly validate the claims of the magisterium. If the Reformed simply quote more Bible passages to the Roman Catholics, it will not persuade them if they already start from an infallible magisterium. But my point is merely that the epistemological assumption comes first and is itself necessary if one seeks to “prove” the point from the text.
And likewise, if the Romanist would tell the Reformed to submit to the infallible magisterium which Christ instituted, the Reformed will ask which Bible passages support this and how they can know that the infallible magisterium is the Roman Church. Rome is not relying upon Bible passages alone to make her arguments because she believes the infallible magisterium is prior to interpreting Scripture, and this cannot satisfy the Reformed who want to see the argument derived from Scripture alone.
The deadlock endures, and both positions are effectively unfalsifiable. This is why I say they are epistemological principles from which we proceed; we cannot proceed to them, at least not directly and demonstratively.
To provide a clarifying example, compare the epistemological issue of the reliability of sense perception. Trusting sense perception is, for most sensible philosophers, a sine qua non requisite for any further knowing and philosophy. But one could doubt that fundamental assumption of reliability of sense perception, as many skeptics have done. Maybe this fundamental doubt inevitably leads to agnosticism, nihilism, and inveterate skepticism. Yet one cannot fundamentally prove to another that he can and should trust his senses. We can suggest that the basic reliability of sense perception is more probable than not, and that the world becomes unintelligible if we cannot rely on something as fundamental as one’s own sense perception. But the epistemological principle itself is one that cannot be proven or disproven but must be taken a priori as the basis of all that is to follow.
This is the case, as I see it, with regard to the divergent epistemologies of Romanism and Reformed theology: neither one could persuade the other because all the persuasion is downstream from these epistemological principles. For those in both camps, their respective epistemological principle is as foundational and indispensable as the basic reliability of sense perception in the example above. One can argue which principle is more probable, which causes greater stability or confusion, which seems more in line with the Divine character, which gives rise to a more coherent theological system, and so on. But neither side can demonstratively use their own epistemological principles to disprove the other’s epistemology.
Even John Henry Newman, the great Romanist convert and now a doctor of the Roman church, admitted in The Development of Doctrine that the claim of an infallible magisterium is itself a fallible claim that is but probable. He argued that, given the character of God in revelation and redemption, it is more probable that God would provide an infallible magisterium than not: “A revelation is not given, if there be no authority to decide what it is that is given” (72). If it is probable that doctrine indeed develops,
so is the probability also of the appointment in that scheme of an external authority to decide upon [developments], thereby separating them from the mass of mere human speculation, extravagance, corruption, and error, in and out of which they grow. This is the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church; for by infallibility I suppose is meant the power of deciding whether this, that, and a third, and any number of theological or ethical statements are true (64).
It is Newman’s judgement that this is more probable than not, given the nature of Divine revelation and redemption, yet the Reformed by their own reasoning would say it is more probable than not that God sufficiently revealed everything necessary for salvation and morals in the Scriptures, which is the Reformed doctrine of the perspicuity of Scripture. Both are making assumptions (not demonstrations) about what is more probable about the character of revelation and the church.
Tradeoffs
These assumptions lead to different outcomes, the complexity of which I will not attempt to trace thoroughly here. Yet some characteristics are easily discernible. Because Protestants deny the existence of a single, visible, infallible ecclesiastical institution, we must endure the discomfort of having multiple Protestant denominations differing on doctrines like church polity, the sacraments, predestination, the Christian Sabbath, and so on. We argue about which positions are most biblical, yet we do not have recourse to a single human authority to “settle” the questions for us. Roman Catholics, on the other hand, claim the advantages of having a single, visible head of the church and institutional unity. The Roman church can authoritatively “settle” doctrinal and ethical questions. However attractive this position may seem, it excludes the possibility of Catholics legitimately disagreeing with their ecclesiastical superiors. No matter how far-fetched the Roman dogmas may be, if they are commanded to be believed and held de fide, it would be wrong for ordinary Catholics to object.
Also, it would be naïve to fall for the claim that Roman Catholicism’s externally visible unity is superior to internecine Protestant fights between and within denominations. There are great disagreements and lack of accord within Roman Catholic churches on issues of theological liberalism, the sacraments, the authority and legitimate interpretation of ecclesiastical councils (e.g., Vatican II), marriage and sexuality, socio-political teaching, validity of successions and ordinations, proper liturgical practices (e.g. traditional Latin mass vs. novus ordo), Marxist liberation theology, feminism, and more. And this is not even to consider the ways in which Roman Catholic claims are at odds with prior statements and positions of Roman Catholicism in prior centuries. It is inaccurate to suppose that Rome has solved the problem of divergent teachings and practices through promoting an infallible magisterium.
By pointing out that the different Reformed and Romanist epistemological starting points are unfalsifiable to one another, as well as that they lead to tradeoffs, I do not mean to suggest a relativism as if we cannot decide between the two. My main point is to increase understanding. As I see it, these different epistemologies are a key reason why most Protestants and Catholics talk past one another when they dialogue or debate. It actually helps Protestants to know this about Roman Catholicism, and it can lead to increased understanding of one another, to better conversations, and to more intelligent framing of the many other issues that Reformed and Romanists debate. And we should not let such debates hinder our attempts to work alongside one another for cultural restoration even as we unapologetically claim our Protestant convictions.
As Protestants, we believe that the Reformed epistemology of sola Scriptura matches the way the Lord calls us in the Scriptures to reverence His Word above all merely earthly authorities. We ultimately must yield our allegiance not to fallible men who claim divine authority but to the “living and active” Word of God (Heb. 4:12).
Image: Ghent Altarpiece (1432). Wikimedia Commons.
