Charlie Kirk, the Sixth Commandment, and Public Vengeance
“Not everyone that spares is a friend; nor is everyone that strikes, an enemy. Better are the stripes of a friend than the voluntary kisses of an enemy. It is better to love with severity, than to deceive with leniency. He that binds a frenzied man, and wakes the one who is sick from lethargy, troubles them both, and yet he loves them both. Who can love us more than God himself does? And yet, just as he teaches us mildly, so he does not cease to terrify us to our health.”
– Augustine
In the wake of the assassination of Charlie Kirk, and especially after what can only be described as an incredible and unexpected televised memorial service, questions of the ethics of vengeance have occupied much of the discourse. The apparent dichotomy between the response of Erika Kirk and Donald Trump at the memorial illustrates the tension. We are told to forgive our enemies, after all, to not seek our own vindication or revenge. And we rightly applaud Erika Kirk for publicly doing so even when the assassin has not asked for forgiveness. But then we have the chief magistrate explicitly refusing to do so, even recalling, perhaps only half-tongue-in-cheek, how he never forgives his enemies and that this time would be no exception. Trump, of course, issued no forgiveness to his own would-be assassin.
Many on the Right have issued calls for vengeance for Charlie Kirk against Tyler Robinson—calls for his execution—and the violence of the Left generally, their funders and organizers—the entire apparatus. In a word, public retribution. Is this justified? Is it moral? Is retribution the only consideration in executing justice? Would public execution of Robinson, as some have called for, satisfy or excite emotions? Many Evangelical leaders instinctually recoil from such talk. They want to universalize, to all stations (public and private), the sentiment of Kirk’s widow. Our Protestant tradition may surprise them.
Crime and Hate
To state the obvious, the sixth commandment prohibits murder. It is the first crime committed after man had been cast out of paradise and, self-preservation being the first law of nature, the crime most recognized universally by nature. Murder, therefore, is the most universally punished of crimes. To not punish it, said Richard Baxter (1615-1691), is “opening a door to confusion, and all calamity in the world.” It matters not whether the slain is righteous or evil. If he is evil, murder sends his soul to hell. If the victim is righteous, the world is deprived of a blessing. Unjustified homicide is, quite literally, playing God—it is idolatrous.
Equally obvious to Christians is that charity should govern our interactions. We are to love our enemies, pity them, pray for them. Christians should not give into anger, envy, or wrath which often manifests in murder, remembering that “whoever hath offended you, hath offended God by greater injuries,” and that we have offended God ourselves more than any have offended us. But because so few live up to this standard, “troublesome tumults” ensue, and God has supplied means for tempering tumults and vindicating his righteousness on earth. Bloodshed is not properly the genesis of government, but it is nevertheless a cause for it this side of Eden. The only time the “image of God,” that favorite slogan of Evangelical thought leaders (which they bend into a comprehensive ethic), appears is in the context of capital punishment.
We must guard against anger and its unbridled effects, but, like killing in self-defense, it can be justified. Anger is wrong when it proceeds from “evil and corrupt affections,” but approved when it springs from hatred of sin. Yes, Christians should learn to hate. As Heinrich Bullinger (1504-1575) put is, a godly man, out of zeal for God, is righteously angry at the “iniquity and naughtiness of mankind.” Hating what God hates is, in fact, good. Hating murder is good, and calling on God ordained authority to hate and punish murder is good. The godly man does not, in his hatred of sin, circumvent the authority charged with restraining sin. Private revenge, vigilantism, is improper, especially revenge for private wrongs done to private men. But, again, calling on the vicar of God to punish the enemies of God (i.e., to do his job) is proper, as modeled by imprecatory psalms. It is wrong for private persons to take on an office and power not given to them, but it is right for them to call on public persons to execute their office and power. Calling for vengeance for public wrongs is good. Public vengeance is instructive, deters evil, and may even save the soul of the perpetrator insofar as it spurs repentance and contrition.
The past three weeks have shown the need for vengeance: sin multiplied, stability threatened, innocent fearful. The magistrate should not sheath his sword. Yet, Matthew 5:38-42 suggests that even as the magistrate is dutybound to perform justice, it is not always the private man’s duty to demand it on his own behalf. He must be willing to suffer injustice for the good of others. Yet, “this disobligeth not magistrates to do justice, or men to seek it,” only that the Christian man is not hellbent on his own gain. For, “both nature and grace do teach us to lay down our lives, for the welfare of the church or state, and to prefer a multitude before ourselves,” says Baxter. “It belongeth only to the magistrate, and not to you, to be the avenger.”
Guilt and Violence
Who is guilty of public violence? Who is responsible for the murder of Charlie Kirk, for the attempted assassination of President Trump? Mike Pence and his ilk would limit the blame to lone, lunatic gunmen. Maybe it’s the internet’s fault. Maybe more commentary on the dangers of the digital will fix it. Or maybe the best explanation is the obvious one.
As Bullinger discerned, it is not just the act of murder itself—not just the perpetrator—that incurs guilt. “All egging on, therefore, and provoking to anger is utterly forbidden; slanderous taunts and brawling statements are flatly prohibited; strife, wrath, and envy, are plainly commanded to be suppressed.” Guilt for murder is not limited to the act itself. Incitement to sin brings guilt of the sin incited.
“We kill diverse ways: either we ourselves do the deed, or else we use the help of others to strike the blow; it is done either secretly or openly. And in this way, again there are very many fashions. For sometimes we commit murder by holding our peace, sometimes by dissembling, by giving ill counsel, by consenting, by aiding, or by egging someone on to evil. Another perhaps would not do the thing that he does, except that he sees you hasten him on; except that he knows he will please you by it, and because he perceives that your help upholds him. Therefore, even though you do not strike the blow with your own hand, yet the murder that another commits by your setting him on, shall be imputed to you as well as if you yourself had killed the man. And this is no marvel, since John, the apostle and evangelist, calls hatred manslaughter.”
Egging others on to murder, sowing hatred, demonizing (as they say)—the things that may predictably and often lead men to murder—all these carry guilt for any resultant murder.
Hypothetically, imagine you were a journalist at a major national outlet. For years you repeatedly compared a public figure to a genocidal maniac—Satan incarnate. This figure was ushering in an authoritarian hellscape, you suggested. You knew that this comparison would stir up fear, resentment, and violence. That was the point. The sole ethical test for this scenario was already well established: it is justifiable to resist Satan by all means necessary, up to and including murder. You even not so subtly suggested, at various points and various means and mediums, that murder against this figure and his entire class of vocal supporters might, indeed, be necessary. This persistent and notorious exercise in murderous propaganda would, according to Bullinger, constitute guilt for murder. Those who praise or falsely justify killing likewise incur guilt.
It also matters who is killed. Violence toward public men, magistrates, leaders is worse than violence toward private citizens because the former constitutes an attack on superiors and the entire polity—half of Americans, let’s say—through the figurehead. Whereas permitting murder of private persons repeatedly and at scale eventually degrades the commonwealth, encouraging and permitting murder of public persons constitutes a direct (rather than aggregated) attack on the whole and expedites this process of deterioration. We have already considered how the private man should respond to personal, private injustices with charity and longsuffering. But how should public men respond to public wrongs? What should the people expect or even demand?
Punishment and Vengeance
A distinction must be made between public justice and private revenge. Of course, secular government is “exempted” from the absolute law against murder which forbids the private man to kill anyone. The magistrate, on the other hand, “kills at God’s command” either for the violation of law or for the defense of his people. As murder is a sin against God, said Baxter, “the magistrate is bound to punish, and private men to endeavour it by the magistrate.”
“The enemies of the public peace must by punishment be restrained.” And, of course, this killing is limited by justice and equity, by the law of God. Such authority can, obviously, be abused, as when Jezebel executed Naboth. Proportionality must also control: a thief is not the same as a murderer and negligence is not the same as malice. But this power can also be abused by “peevish pity and foolish clemency.” Acquitting a wicked person, an enemy of God and the people, is dereliction of duty.
Vengeance is the Lord’s, and the magistrate is God on earth (Ex. 22:28; Deut. 1:17). Souls are subject to him. Vengeance is his for the cause of God. He is armed with the sword to, in fact, use it. He is ordained to safeguard the good and punish evil—ruthlessly on both counts—for the Lord’s sake. At bare minimum, this entails the safety of the people and tranquility of the polity. The sword is, indeed, a witness of God, but it is a witness to his righteous anger, wrath, and protection.
The first requisite quality Bulliner identifies, advising on magistrate selection, is that a magistrate be a man of “strength or force.” He must be able to do the job; he needs a “boldness of stomach.” He must dare to command, to execute his office. Before the qualification of fearing God (grace), the magistrate must have the nature of a ruler. He must have the ambition and stomach to order, judge, and punish.
In other words, the magistrate must be willing and able to appear cruel, he must be terrifying. Just severity will almost always be perceived this way, especially by a soft, liberal society like ours. Unless the magistrate is cruel, crueller things will be visited on the people. Just severity, despite appearances, is merciful. It is a safeguard to the innocent, one that is not self-executing, no matter how perfect the laws of the commonwealth are. Just severity requires animated law, a magistrate of “princely stomach” who hates evil and loves his people and is sensitive to the needs and mood of the commonwealth. Judgment is to be performed impartially, and punishment is to be doled out consistently, and both acts must keep the proper ends—the magistrate’s job description—in mind. In a sinful world, this is no easy task. Most of us are too soft and too fearful to ever perform said task; we are fittingly private people.
But it must be done. Indulgence of evil, especially grave evil, reproduces evil, oppresses the good, and harms the reputation of government. Laxity and permissiveness erode trust and safety alike and gives false instruction to citizens. The sword is intended to punish evildoers and repel violence from enemies of good, including “foreign enemies abroad” as well as “seditious and contentious citizens at home.” The magistrate does not bear the sword in vain. “For the sword is God’s vengeance, or instrument, with which he strikes the blow to revenge himself upon his enemies for the injury done to him.” The most basic job of the magistrate is to express God’s hatred of sin and love of order. God’s character is not left without a defender on earth.
The private person is commanded not to kill, but “public vengeance” is an “ordinary use of the sword” approved by God. This vengeance, by definition, cannot be used to avenge private wrongs, but it is sinful to sheath it in the face of public wrongs. Vengeance belongs to the Lord in both cases, but his means of vengeance are varied. God alone avenges private wrongs, but the vicar of God avenges public ones this side of heaven.
If the bearer of the sword neglects his office by “pardoning those who were not worthy to be forgiven, and by letting them go, he has left the innocent unrevenged.” By this negligence, the magistrate becomes a “partaker of the injury done, and the shedding of the innocent’s blood… He leaves it unrevenged by letting the murderer go untouched, on whose neck the Lord charged to let the sword fall.” “Peevish pity” does not honor God; it will only instill courage in evil doers and give occasion to evil. Underenforced laws degrade all authority. Indeed, Bullinger says that undeserved clemency to the unrepentant enemy of the people tempts men to “abandon the scruple of conscience,” it is tacit consent to mischief.
And the problem doesn’t go away because of leniency. If you will not execute a man for one murder you will be forced to execute him for many murders; if you will not execute one man for murder you will be forced to execute many men for many murders. And the innocent who suffer literally and spiritually are tempted to take up the sword themselves. Worst of all, the reputation of God suffers among guilty and innocent alike as the earthly picture of his righteousness is degraded before men. If you want an atheist society then don’t punish people, don’t enforce law, present no public father figure.
Clemency and Severity
What of clemency, then? Is leniency (commuting punishment) ever appropriate? Magistrates can grant clemency at their discretion, of course, but there are evident guidelines for when this is justified, viz., the interest of the public good. When, for example, criminals are arrested and released 40 times over, it must be considered whether this clemency is contributing to the public good, especially when this practice enables greater crimes.
Moreover, clemency, Thomas Aquinas teaches (through Seneca et al.), is not the same as meekness (though both are expressions of temperance and moderation). Clemency is leniency of a superior toward an inferior. Private citizens cannot practice it in this way, whereas meekness is to govern their mutual relations. Clemency and meekness are, we might say, moderating virtues meant to restrain excesses. Clemency and meekness subject appetite to reason. These are not principal virtues, but serve or facilitate principal virtues, viz., charity, prudence, and justice. In other words, clemency and meekness are not practiced for their own sake but as a means to greater virtues. Clemency and meekness are intended as means to conquer impediments to charity, prudence, and justice. These virtues moderate passions and actions. Justice, for example, restrains men from crimes which are an expression of immoderate loves (lusts).
Likewise, because man is prone to excessive anger, clemency mitigates punishment in order to prevent the effects of excessive anger which can subvert justice and the public good. At the same time, imprudent laxity can subvert justice and the public good. As a general rule, clemency is not usually appropriate. Usually, equity calls for adherence to the law. Yet, punishment should be proportional and moderate (according to the circumstances), which is to say, not overly lenient nor sadistic. Both the mitigation and execution of punishment must be guided by reason.
Neither clemency nor meekness are opposed to severity as such, only opposed to unreasonable or inflexible use of severity. Severity is often called for and human propensity for anger and leniency alike must not be allowed to confuse the moral assessment unto equity. Temperance controls both laxity and anger. As Aquinas notes, established law, legal strictures, act as an embodiment of temperance. This is why they exist in this regard and are followed, viz., so that equity is maintained in the face of oscillating passions. Law takes vengeance out of private hands and insulates it from unruly passions by placing it in the hands of magistrates to exercise justice and restraint.
Clemency is a departure from the letter of law for the sake of equity in service to the public good. Human laws are imperfect and cannot foresee all possible circumstances. Sometimes equity requires leniency. Magistrates alone can make this judgment. And, again, they are restricted by these aims in their exercise of clemency. Said exercise must be prudent and must serve justice, and behind these abstract ends is the longevity and peace of the commonwealth. The object and effect of a crime, as well as the condition of the criminal and the commonwealth, must be considered in tandem. It is entirely justified for the public to call on magistrates to exercise both prudence and severity against public wrongs. Murder is always a public wrong—hence, why criminal cases are handled by prosecution and not civil suit (the offense is against the state)—but especially when perpetrated against public men. Insisting that magistrates act with a princely stomach against hateworthy things is good. Calls for retribution and vengeance on behalf of the whole are neither selfish nor unmerciful, especially when the wrongs in question tend to the dissolution of the commonwealth. Unenforced laws degrade the integrity of law; unpunished crime degrades order and threatens authority.
Conclusion
Here we have considered the place of public vengeance in the context of murder and in light of the killing of Charlie Kirk. What of other past (and current) public wrongs from the left, viz., Russiagate, Covid policy, the Summer of Love (2020), obstruction of justice, election tampering, etc.? There are some, even sober, analysists who will call for a response of leniency and clemency. Maybe this would be more salutary, more healing for the nation, they wonder. I ask here only what about the past decade suggests that the perpetrators of these public wrongs and excesses are looking for a ceasefire, for contrition-bought leniency? What about the lawlessness of Memphis or the viciousness of Chicago suggest a willingness to shape up?
The Right, the Trump administration itself, have been remarkably longsuffering. Assertion of Article IV powers and the enforcement of standing immigration law is hardly an overbearing response. Notice too the disparity between Left and Right responses to martyrdom. The Left’s reaction was a season of violence and destruction. The Right’s was prayer and vigils. As American citizens begin to question the potency of law and doubt their own safety, what does the public good require? What will accomplish stability and order? What will restrain evil and reward good? What will provide mercy to the innocent? Assurance to the vulnerable? What does love and care of Americans, our friends, the sons and daughters of the magistrate, require? Compassion to whom? Evil doers? Enemies of the republic? Sowers of lawlessness and licentiousness?
What should and will be done is a question that only the magistrate can answer, but we would be right to call for justice, for retribution even, against enemies of the peace, however severe and cruel it may appear. Sometimes the gloves do need to come off, swords need to be unsheathed. Sometimes vengeance is the right response.
